The National Center for Critical Incident Analysis was started by a diverse group that includes experts in medicine and public health, law enforcement and national security, sociology and journalism. It is an independent organization affiliated with the National Defense University Foundation.
The NCCIA was started by our chairman emeritus, Frank Ochberg, M.D., who defined the "Stockholm Syndrome" to describe how some hostages reacted to a terrorist incident. The chair, Ford Rowan, is a former journalist at NBC and PBS, and an attorney who helped corporations in crisis management. The vice chair, Bert Brown, M.D., is a former head of the National Institutes of Mental Health. The director of research, Stephen Prior, Ph.D., is an expert in bioterrorism. Donald A. Bassett, M.S.C.M, is a former Air Force pilot, retired FBI Special Agent who co-founded and managed the FBI's Special Weapons and Tactics and Crisis Management Programs. For biographical sketches of all directors, click here.
The NCCIA was designed to be an independent forum for analyzing critical incidents.
The NCCIA focuses on critical incidents, broadly defined. A Critical Incident is a relatively brief occurrence involving injury, loss, or conflict of significant proportion, with the potential to change existing societal norms. Critical incidents are usually traumatic, threatening the bonds of trust that bind democracies.
Members of the NCCIA have responded to and/or analyzed critical incidents such as the following: the Columbine school shooting, the Oklahoma City bombing, Three Mile Island nuclear accident, suicide bombings in Israel, and the 9/11 attacks.
The NCCIA was founded by persons who had analyzed similar problems at the University of Virginia, as part of the Critical Incident Analysis Group. Members of the NCCIA worked on projects on bioterrorism (before the 2001 anthrax attacks) and alternatives to quarantine in a national health emergency. For a look at previous reports click here.
The NCCIA is affiliated with the National Defense University Foundation and holds conferences and workshops at the National Defense University. The NCCIA was started with a generous grant from the Dart Foundation. We have an independent board and our own sources of funding (from corporations, foundations and individuals) and we are not controlled by any government agency.
We have a collaborative and productive relationship with several agencies, especially the NDU, in Washington, D.C. To visit the NDU website, click here. To visit the NDU Foundation, click here.
Most of the problems we study have implications that transcend the boundaries between various agencies and levels of government. For example, the response to a chemical, biological or nuclear attack would involve responders from local and state governments, as well as several federal agencies. Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Defense, the FBI and other intelligence agencies would all be involved. An interdisciplinary approach is necessary. So the NCCIA is not bound to any one agency.
The NCCIA is a young organization that plans to hold a major conference and several workshops each year. Our first one was before the 2004 elections when we analyzed the Madrid bombing and the potential for political violence in the United States. Our second conference was in March 2005 when we looked at the potential impact of a pandemic. In recent months we have conducted workshops for state and local officials around the country on how to prepare for and respond to a pandemic. We plan to meet to hold workshops on problems associated with responding to various threats to the public.
While our meetings are not open to the public, we plan to invite journalists to participate and to report on what we discuss. We are not dealing with classified information and we want to ensure that the public has access to useful information before and during any emergency.
Many agencies and think tanks focus on predicting potential terrorist threats and making risk assessments. The NCCIA is focusing on potential responses to various risks and how the response might be improved. We pay particular attention to the psychosocial and communication implications. We believe that prudent steps taken before an incident can mitigate damage.
There are two main ways that a society can withstand the threats posed by terrorists, home grown criminals and destructive natural dangers (including tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, drought). The first is by prediction prevention and timely mitigation before an incident. The second is by building more robust systems that can take a hit and recover quickly after an incident. Robust systems usually include redundancy and slack (for example, extra hospital beds for use in a crisis). By definition, robust systems involve inefficiencies. To minimize inefficiencies careful study needs to be done on how to best improve the resiliency of social systems.
While others are concentrating on the essential effort to prevent problems, the NCCIA is helping to find ways to strengthen society in case an emergency does happen.
The NCCIA organizes conferences and workshops that bring together experts and practitioners to deliberate on the nature of various threats, the implications of specific critical incidents and the response capability both currently and optimally. From these discussions the practitioners are better able to do their work and the NCCIA members are able to develop recommendations for improvements. These ideas are disseminated to government officials and the public. The NCCIA expects to publish results of our studies electronically and in print.
Our first conference in October 2004, on political violence, is summarized in an article prepared before the presidential election.
Our second conference in March 2005, on the potential for influenza pandemic, is summarized here.
Our report Weathering the Storm is postedhere.